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Abstract:

This thesis will create an argument for how the victims of gang violence from the
Northern Triangle nations of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras qualify for
asylum in the United States based on a well-founded fear of persecution. An
analysis of the legal framework of the asylum system in the United States, profiles
of the two largest gangs in the Northern Triangle the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio
18, a profile of the asylum seekers arriving at the United States border, the criminal
activity that the gangs engage in, and the way that this activity is political in nature
will form the argument that gang violence is inherently political in the Northern
Triangle. UNHCR reports and local Northern Triangle police data will illustrate
the circumstances of de facto gang rule in the region and DHS statistics will show
how the growing numbers of Central American asylees necessitate a U.S. policy
change regarding victims of gang violence.
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Introduction
On February 15th, 2019 President Trump stood in the White House Rose Garden and
shared his views on the influx of Central Americans at the Southern border, stating: “We’re talking
about an invasion of our country with drugs, with human traffickers, with all types of criminals
and gangs”1 This rhetoric is not new for the Trump administration and discussions of a border
wall, a border crisis, and gang infiltration of the United States have been popular in U.S. media
since his inauguration. What the Trump administration gets wrong about this “invasion” is that
the threat of gang violence is not present at U.S. at the Southern Border, on the contrary the
migrants at the border are in fact the gangs’ victims. Trump’s labeling of asylees at the border as
“criminals and gangs” is an effort to fund a wall that will keep out the region’s most vulnerable
migrants, the asylee victims of gang violence. Seven months prior to President Trump’s Rose
Garden proclamation, on June 11, 2018 then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions stated: “Generally,
claims by aliens pertaining to… gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not
qualify for asylum.”2 This statement ignores the complicated reality of how the gangs and the
government in the Northern Triangle nations of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are related,
and how they are both perpetrators of the gang violence that the Central American asylees are
fleeing. Post-war gang proliferation and rampant government corruption in the Northern Triangle
have blurred the line separating governmental actors from gang members, and civilian opposition
to gang violence has become inherently political. Refusing to be extorted, recruited, or sexually
assaulted are political acts in the context of de facto gang rule and should be treated as such in the
U.S. immigration system.

1

Paletta, Damien, Mike DeBonis, and John Wagner. "Trump Declares National Emergency on
Southern Border in Bid to Build Wall." The Washington Post, February 15, 2019.
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A history of societal upheaval and social unrest has created an environment in which
criminal organizations and government entities in the Northern Triangle nations often lack clear
boundaries. The region was ravaged by civil wars and economic dependence on foreign aid in the
twentieth century and the aftermath of decades of brutality created a migration surge of Central
American migrants into the United States. When immigration policies in the 1990s led to record
numbers of deportations, gang ties that were created in the U.S. were exported to the weakened
societies of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras and security and economic forces were easily
manipulated to the advantage of criminal organizations. The governments’ attempts at hardline
anti-gang policies backfired, creating an impetus for higher gang recruitment and more widespread
government mistrust. As a result, “Gangs in Central America ended up more violent and more
organized because government responses compelled them to strengthen, as well as provided the
opportunities and resources to do it through the areas of illegality and the networks of crime
broadened by such policies.”3 The gangs have been able to recruit, adapt, and fortify their
structures in response to these failed policies and their political intrusions have become a threat to
democracy in the region. This thesis will argue that the failure of state governments’ and
transformation of the gangs into political entities gives the asylees coming to the United States a
legitimate claim to asylum based on a well-founded fear of political persecution.
This thesis will explain how the gang violence in the Northern Triangle constitutes
legitimate political persecution by first establishing the legal definitions of asylum, political
persecution, and gangs in “Chapter I. Central Definitions” using historical definitions rooted in the
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations 1951 Convention

3

Bruneau, Thomas C., Lucía Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner. Maras: Gang Violence and
Security in Central America. Austin, TX. University of Texas Press. 2012. 139.
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Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the United States Immigration and Nationality Act. The
second chapter, “Northern Triangle Gangs,” will outline the major gangs in the region and will use
historical accounts of the region’s civil unrest, the migration of Central Americans to the United
States, and their subsequent deportations back to the Northern Triangle to show how the gangs
were formed. Various National Police reports will then explain the demographics of the gangs in
question. “Chapter III. Asylum Trends & Demographics” will create a profile of the asylum
seekers relevant to this analysis using Department of Homeland Security data and United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees reports. After profiling the perpetrators and victims of gang
violence in the region the fourth chapter, “Well-Founded Fear” will then describe how said
violence constitutes a well-founded fear of persecution and describe the conditions that the Central
American asylum seekers are fleeing using FBI reports, detailed Insight Crime reports regarding
gang activity in the region, World Bank, and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
reports. The fifth and final chapter of this thesis, “The Politics of Gangs,” will elaborate on how
the combination of the inefficiency of government forces, the widespread regional corruption, and
the politicization of the gang actors makes the persecution political by using various United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reports of corruption, reports from the Due Process of
Law Foundation, and AmericasBarometer studies of public trust in the government. The variety
of data and sources used in this thesis serve to argue that the asylum applications in the United
States from victims of gang violence in the Northern Triangle are based on a legitimate political
persecution and their asylum claims should be adjudicated as such.
Chapter I. Central Definitions
An effective analysis of asylum, persecution based on political opinion, and gang violence
necessitates the establishment of certain definitions. Starting with “asylum,” this thesis will

3
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explain how the laws governing U.S. immigration law are set in the Immigration and Nationality
Act, (INA) whose definitions are based on the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees
(UNHCR) and the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) definitions of
a refugee. Using these documents, this chapter will define asylum by looking at the definition of
a refugee offered by the UNHCR 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and how
this definition is built upon Article 14 of the 1948 UDHR, where the right to asylum is first
recognized internationally. In order to clarify a definition of “persecution based on political
opinion,” this chapter also sets out to establish what the definition of political opinion is with
regards to asylum and immigration legal precedence in the United States. Finally, this chapter will
define who the relevant actors are in this analysis of gang violence by defining “gangs” in
accordance with U.S. law and detailing which specific gang actors are at work in the Northern
Triangle nations. A brief historical background will accompany each definition to provide context
for the analysis that follows.
Asylum
The history of the asylum system in the United States begins with the 1948 United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Drafted three years after the initial establishment of the
United Nations, the document outlines the basic human rights that will be protected universally.
The first of its kind, the signatories to the UDHR believed that “the equal and inalienable rights of
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”4
Among the protected rights listed in the document are rights to security, protection from torture,
religious freedom, and freedom of movement. The Declaration also explicitly declares the
universal right to asylum in Article 14:

4
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“Article 14: 1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum
from persecution. 2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions
genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes
and principles of the United Nations”5
Points 14.1 and 14.2 of the UDHR are relevant to this analysis because the first part explicitly
states that “everyone” has the right to seek asylum, but the second part sets limits to this by
excluding the victims of “non-political crimes.” This point is important in regard to this thesis
because it shows how gang violence must be considered political in order to serve as grounds for
asylum, as per the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was created in 1950, just
two years after the publication of the UDHR and five years after the founding of the United
Nations. Initially established as a response to the refugee crisis facing Europe at the end of World
War II, the office has since been involved in numerous international crises of forcibly displaced
communities, stateless persons, and refugee crises. The UNHCR 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees explicitly defines the term “refugee” and sets out to define refugee rights and
national obligations to refugee protection. Article 1 (A) (2) of the Convention defines a refugee
as:
“Any person who… owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”6
The particular parts of this definition that are of interest to this analysis are the concepts of “wellfounded fear of persecution” and “political opinion,” as the basis of this thesis will be to explore
how victims of gang violence in the Northern Triangle have legitimate political asylum claims in

5

U.N. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” 4.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.” Geneva. 1951. 14.
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the U.S. Showing that the violence they face constitutes a “well-founded fear” and how refusing
to cooperate with the de-facto rule of the gangs in the region constitutes a “political opinion” is
central to this argument and will be explored in greater detailing in forthcoming chapters. In
addition to defining a refuge, the 1951 Convention emphasizes the need for international
commitment to refugee protection by mandating the concept of “non-refoulment.” Echoing the
language of the Article 1 definition of a refugee and central to the Convention’s principals, nonrefoulment is defined in Article 33 as follows:
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion.”7
Non-refoulment is an important aspect of the 1951 Convention as it introduces legal protection for
refugees from being forcibly returned to their home country. The definition of a refugee and the
concept of non-refoulment as outlined in the UNHCR 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees form the foundation for the international definitions of and legal protections afforded to
refugees and asylees.
The United States is a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and therefore its immigration laws relating to asylum and refugees reference the Convention’s
language as well. U.S. immigration law is dictated by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
the first Act in U.S. history to organize immigration and citizenship laws into one document.
While there have been numerous amendments to the Act since it was first enacted in 1952, the
current definition of an asylee in the INA section 1158(b)(1)(A) states that an alien may be granted
asylum if they fall under the definition of a refugee. The INA definition of a refugee is then found

7
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in section 1101(a)(42)(A) and is almost the verbatim definition of a refugee under the UNHCR
1951 Convention, with the INA text as follows:
“Any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case
of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last
habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”8
While listing these separate definitions may seem redundant, it is important to trace the roots of
the definition of asylum in this manner because asylees are not explicitly defined in the UDHR,
UNHCR, or INA. Asylees and refugees differ in their manner of arrival to the receiving nation,
with asylees applying for asylum either at the port-of-entry or once within the receiving nation’s
borders and refugees are processed in a third-party nation and arrive at the receiving nation with a
pre-determined refugee status. Nonetheless, in U.S. asylum law all legal definitions of an asylee
are rooted in the United Nations’ historical definitions of a refugee, and for the purpose of this
thesis the precise legal definition of an asylee in the U.S. must be made clear.
Persecution Based on Political Opinion
The definition of “persecution based on political opinion” in relation to asylum law is
legally elusive; not in any of the documents and laws governing asylum is there a clear definition
of what constitutes political persecution. When no legal definition is mandated in law, a legal
definition relies on case precedents and in the case of asylum law in the U.S. there has been little
regarding gang violence. An asylum practice advisory issued by the National Immigrant Justice
Center succinctly explains the current state of legal precedence regarding asylum for victims of

8

United States of America. “Immigration and Nationality Act, with Amendments and Notes on
Related Laws: Committee Print for the Use of the Committee on the Judiciary.” House of
Representatives. United States. Washington. 1980. Section 1158(b)(1)(A).
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gang violence. The advisory explains how Jeff Sessions’ 2018 decision regarding asylum for
survivors of domestic violence and violence perpetrated by non-state actors overrules a prior
decision granting asylum for these victims in particular situations. The advisory then explains,
“While the decision gives the impression that these claims are foreclosed, nearly all the damaging
language is dicta, and the Refugee Convention, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and
precedential case law at the Courts of Appeals and Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) continue
to support much of what the BIA previously held in [the previous precedent]. In short, the
holding… is narrow and much of the damage done is a matter of optics, not law.”9 This means
that while then-Attorney General Sessions intended to create a precedent that would exclude
victims of domestic and gang violence from asylum in the U.S., the legal framework regarding
these groups is still rooted in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the INA
and is generally favorable to the populations in question.
Gangs
The United States Code defines the subject matter of all of the laws in the United States;
the document is divided by subject and published every six years by the Office of the Law Revision
Counsel of the U.S. House of Representatives. According to the U.S. Code Title 18 (Crimes and
Criminal Procedure), under Part 1 (Crimes), Chapter 26 (Criminal Street Gangs), Section 521 a
gang is defined in U.S. Federal Law as:
“An ongoing group, club, organization, or association of 5 or more persons—
(A) that has as 1 of its primary purposes the commission of 1 or more of the criminal
offenses described in subsection (c);
(B) the members of which engage, or have engaged within the past 5 years, in a
continuing series of offenses described in subsection (c); and
(C) the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce.”
9

National Immigrant Justice Center. "Applying for Asylum After Matter of A-B: Matter of A-BChanges the Complexion of Claims Involving Non-State Actors, but Asylum Fundamentals
Remain Strong and Intact." Asylum Practice Advisory. June 2018. 1.
8
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The offenses referenced in subsection (c) include felonies involving controlled substances felonies
involving crimes of violence, any offense involving human trafficking or sexual abuse, and
conspiracy to commit any of the previously mentioned crimes. This federal definition is used by
both the Department of Justice for U.S. interior crime enforcement and the Department of
Homeland Security for immigration-related crime enforcement.

Following this provided

language, the two main gangs in the Northern Triangle nations that will be analyzed in this thesis,
Mara Salvatrucha, also known as MS-13 and Barrio 18, also known as La 18 can be legally
classified as gangs in U.S. federal law. Both gangs are involved in extensive criminal activities
and networks, and the members of the gangs engage directly with the crimes. Additional details
on the history and demographics of MS-13 and La 18 as well as the activities they engage in will
be detailed in Chapter II of this thesis.
While the definitions provided in Chapter I of this thesis are somewhat repetitive, it is
necessary to include the explicit definitions of “asylum,” “persecution based on political opinion,”
and “gangs” because they are the topics most central to an exploration of political asylum for
victims of gang violence in Central America. The inclusion of the exact language that informs
immigration law and outlining the general history of the codification of these terms creates a
framework that can be referenced when looking at the modern understanding of asylum and gang
persecution.
Chapter II. Northern Triangle Gangs
The violence that asylum seekers are fleeing in Central America can be largely attributed
to the two main gangs in the region, Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, and Barrio 18, or La 18. The
initial formation and subsequent proliferation of these two gangs throughout Central America is
directly tied to unrest in the region in the twentieth century and to changes to U.S. immigration

9
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policy in the 1990s. A brief historical context of both follows in order to provide a thorough
definition of the main gang actors and to show the conditions that allowed for their rise to power.
History of MS-13 and La 18
The twentieth century in Central America was marked by widespread civil unrest. In El
Salvador, a civil war raged from 1979 until 1992 and was a brutally violent power struggle between
the military-led government of El Salvador and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
(FMLN), a group of leftist guerilla organizations. In an effort to curb the FMLN, the Salvadoran
military received $3.5 billion in aid from the U.S. government10, fueling a war that saw an
unknown number of disappearances and the deaths of at least 75,000 Salvadorans.11 The brutality
of the Salvadoran Civil War was mirrored in Guatemala in the Guatemalan Civil War that lasted
from 1960 until 1996. Conservative reports of over 200,000 deaths of indigenous Maya have been
reported and the military-led atrocities of the war have since been labelled a genocide.12 While
Honduras did not experience an official civil war like those of El Salvador and Guatemala during
this time, the effect of the neighboring nations’ instability led to a financial crisis and increasing
reliance on U.S. aid. In need of economic support, the Honduran government allowed the Reagan
administration to use Honduras as a military training ground for the El Salvadoran military and

10

United States General Accounting Office. El Salvador: Accountability for U.S. Military and
Economic Aid: Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. Washington, DC: Office, 1990. 8.
11
Wilson, Leah, and Alexis Stoumbelis. "‘Removing the Veil’: El Salvador Apologizes for State
Violence on 20th Anniversary of Peace Accords." North American Congress in Latin America,
January 12, 2012.
12
Rothenberg, Daniel. Memory of Silence: the Guatemalan Truth Commission Report. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2012. 17-23.
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the Contras in Nicaragua,13 making the economic, political, and military relationships in the region
even more complicated and strained.
The history of civil wars and economic unrest in the region created conditions for mass
migration form the Northern Triangle to the United States. Those who migrated were often at an
economic disadvantage upon arriving in the U.S. and relied on the support of their ethnic enclaves
abroad. Ultimately, some of the newly displaced Central Americans in the U.S. ended up joining
or forming gangs in order to protect themselves in an unfamiliar country.14 The passage of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996 during the
Clinton administration increased the immigration consequences for engaging in criminal activities
and resulted in the deportation of thousands of these gang members back to the Northern Triangle.
The gangs then regrouped and fortified their relations in the post-war political vacuums of El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The concentration of gang members in Central America
skyrocketed in the 1990s and early 2000s as a result of this spike in deportations of criminal
offenders back to their native countries in the region.
The two main gangs in power in Central America are Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18.
These two gangs are bitter rivals and while their territory spans throughout Central America,
Mexico, and the U.S., their power and their power struggles are concentrated in the Northern
Triangle. Their structure is difficult to analyze, as MS-13 and La 18 are characterized by their
“fluid, dynamic organization and complex, clandestine hierarchies.”15 Although their structures

13

Rosenberg, Mark B. Honduras in the Central American Conflict: Trends and Recent
Developments. Florida International University Latin American and Caribbean Center. July
1988. 4.
14
Miller, Spring, and James Cavallaro. No Place to Hide: Gang, State, and Clandestine Violence
in El Salvador. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, 2010. 51.
15
Miller, et al. No Place to Hide. 57.
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are intentionally covert, their fundamental features have been shown to involve sophisticated and
transnational organizational structure, consolidation of territorial presence and power, and extreme
violence against those who refuse recruitment or those who live in gang-controlled territories.16
Locals in gang-controlled areas live in fear of being violently recruited or subject to a threatening
gang presence in their hometowns, and the fact that MS-13 and La 18 are at war with each other
only further exacerbates the fear of violence among the Northern Triangle’s population. This
perpetual inter-gang war creates an incredibly hostile race for domination and recruitment amongst
the youth in the region, and protection from the violence of one gang often means joining its rival.
The gangs are prominent in both rural and urban areas alike and often serve as the de facto
law and order where the police are unwilling or unable to work against them. In fact, MS-13 and
La 18 have been able to act as “despotic, de facto governments with commercial and criminal
motives, with a ‘political agenda to control state governing and security institutions' and ‘an agenda
to control people and territory.”17 The power and control that the gangs are able to exercise is a
relatively new, post-IIRIRA phenomena and was intensified by the Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and
Honduran government’s employment of an aggressively harsh anti-gang program called mano
dura, or “iron fist,” in the early 2000s. The main focus of the mano dura plan was to “arrest away”
the gangs and take them off the streets, however this was done in increasingly violent manners,
and has itself been seen as a form of legal violence. Legal violence perpetrated by the state “refers
to the state's legitimate use of force and its capacity to expand its limits in order to fight crime. It
can entail the alteration of laws to provide discretionary powers to state institutions.”18 Mano dura

16

Miller, et al. No Place to Hide. 56-88.
Uchimaya, Diane. "Falling through the Cracks: Gang Victims as Casualties in Current Asylum
Jurisprudence." Berkeley La Raza Law Journal 23 (2015). 109-62. 147-148.
18
Cruz, José Miguel. "Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central America: The Survival
of the Violent State." Latin American Politics and Society 53, no. 04 (Winter 2011). 1-33. 21.
17
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policies manifested in police and military forces further terrorizing the people in their territories
under the guise of rooting out gang members. This policy ultimately led to prison overcrowding,
strengthening of gang ties, and the recruitment of new gang members behind bars, as it has been
reported that those who were wrongfully arrested for being a gang member were successfully
recruited after they were put in prison.19 The failure of the mano dura policies in the region will
be elaborated on further in Chatper V.
The political context that led to the formation of MS-13 and La 18 are useful in
understanding how and why the gangs have spread and gained power in the region and how the
history of gang-rule in the region impacts the general demographics of both MS-13 and La 18.
Gang Demographics: El Salvador
Gang membership in El Salvador grew rapidly following the post-IIRIRA deportations of
gang members back to El Salvador, and MS-13 and La 18 membership soared. The first
comprehensive analysis of gang demographics in El Salvador was completed by undergraduate
students, Margarita Mancía and María de Los Ángeles Salgado at the Universidad
Centroamericana “José Simeón Cañas in San Salvador in 1991. Studying gang membership the
year that the Salvadoran Civil War concluded, the students discovered that over three-quarters of
gang members were lower to lower-middle class males between the ages of seven and thirty-one
years old;20 the demographic makeup of the gangs largely remains the same. The past two decades
have seen a surge in membership and geographic spread of both MS-13 and La 18 in El Salvador.
A 2004 dataset published by the El Salvador Policia Nacional Civil showed that there were roughly
10,200 gang members spread across the fourteen departments of El Salvador, and a 2009 report

19

Uchimaya, Diane. "Falling through the Cracks: Gang Victims as Casualties in Current Asylum
Jurisprudence." Berkeley La Raza Law Journal 23 (2015): 109-162. 129.
20
Bruneau, et. al. “Maras.” 44.
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increased this population to 16,000.21 The history of the nation’s power struggles during its civil
war and the instability left in its aftermath have contributed to the rise in numbers and the
geographic spread of gang members in El Salvador.
Gang Demographics: Guatemala
Neighbor to El Salvador is Guatemala, a country similarly ravaged by civil war in the
twentieth century and home to comparable social, economic, and political turmoil. It follows that
the demographic makeup of gang members is similar to that of El Salvador. While there are other
gangs in Guatemala that engage in criminal activities and violent behaviors, a 2006 USAID
assessment showed that MS-13 and La 18 accounted for 95% of all gang membership in
Guatemala.22 The Policia Nacional Civil in Guatemala has estimated that gang membership in
2006 was between 8,000 and 10,000 individuals23 and a separate report gives the average age of a
Guatemalan gang member to be 14.7 years old.24 The youthfulness of the gang members in
Guatemala has been attributed to the lack of social programs available in the country. In the
aftermath of the 36 yearlong civil, war Guatemala is one of the poorest nations in Latin America
with half of the country living in poverty and only one in three citizens enrolled in educational
programs.25 These post-civil war societal conditions serve as a main contributing factor to
membership in MS-13 and La 18 in Guatemala.
Gang Demographics: Honduras
Honduras, the central neighbor to both nations, has an even equally rampant gang issue.
The Community Police of Honduras has estimated that gang membership in the nation is between

21
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10,000 and 15,000 individuals.26 Located at the center of the Northern Triangle, Honduras shares
large borderlands with both El Salvador and Guatemala and its gang membership may be attributed
to its geographic location. Its borders are vulnerable to a largely unchecked migratory flow
between the three nations of both gang members and gang activities. Thousands of mareros, or
gang members, are at work within Honduras’ borders and “From terrorizing local businesses with
demands for protection ‘taxes’ and threats of violence to intra-gang warfare, hired hits, armed
robberies and assaults on public transport, the two predominant maras… simply outman security
forces in Honduras.”27 Not unlike its neighbors, MS-13 and La 18 have been able to get a strong
foothold in Honduras by overwhelming security and political forces in the nation. The lasting
economic effects of the region’s twentieth-century tumult has left Honduras ill-equipped to deal
with the transnational nature of gang activities.
In conclusion, Chapter II of this thesis details the history and demographics of the two
major gangs in the Northern Triangle in order to give a clear profile of who is involved in the
gangs and where the two gangs function.
Chapter III. Asylum Trends & Demographics
Chapter I of this thesis followed the language in the UDHR, UNHCR, and INA to offer a
legal definition of an asylee, however did not elaborate on the process of applying for asylum in
the U.S. In order to provide a full picture of the experience of Central American asylees it is
necessary to give a brief overview of the ways one can apply for asylum and what the steps of the
process are.
Asylum Process

26
27
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As stated earlier, the difference between a refugee and an asylee is the manner in which
they arrive to the receiving country; in the U.S., refugees apply for refugee status abroad and arrive
to the receiving country as an approved refugee, while asylees can apply for asylum affirmatively
when they arrive at a port of entry or defensively when have already been apprehended by
immigration officials for entering the U.S. without documentation.

Affirmative asylum

applications are processed by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
arm of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and defensive applications are processed by
DHS’ judicial branch, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). Affirmative asylum
applications can be made immediately at a port of entry, such as a border crossing station or marine
entry, or can be made voluntarily within one year of initial authorized entry into the U.S. If
someone has been detained or placed in removal proceeding and applies for defensive asylum in
front of an EOIR judge then the applicant must pass a “credible fear” interview, where a judge
determines the veracity of a persecution claim. If the claim is deemed credible, the applicant can
receive asylum status. If the claim is denied, the applicant will likely be deported back to their
native country.
Asylum applicants from the Northern Triangle nations apply for defensive asylum much
more often than affirmative asylum, and defensive asylum claims are significantly less likely to be
approved. Data from the DHS “Annual Flow Report: Refugees and Asylees: 2017” shows that in
2017, affirmative asylum applicants from El Salvador had a 17.98% approval rate while defensive
asylum applicants had a 3.76% approval rate.28 Similar data is reported for applicants from
Guatemala and Honduras, with 16.58% and 15.98% approval rates for affirmative applications,
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respectively, and 4.41% and 4.72% approval rates for defensive applications.29 The fact that
defensive applications from all three Northern Triangle nations have a significantly lower approval
rate than affirmative applications is important because applicants from all three countries are
significantly more likely to apply for defensive asylum than affirmative asylum. In fact, in 2017
defensive asylum applications from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras made up 75.79%,
63.55%, and 73.90% of all asylum claims, respectively, from each nation.30
A possible factor in the low approval of defensive asylum applications is that non-citizens
in immigration court are not afforded the right to counsel; data from Syracuse University’s
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) shows that between 60% and 80% of those
appearing in immigration court who have never been detained are represented by counsel,
compared to 10% to 30% of those appearing in immigration court who have been detained
appearing with counsel.31 Since apprehension and detention are usually the prerequisite for
defensive asylum applications it follows that previously detained defensive applicants are less
likely to be represented in front of an EOIR judge and therefore more likely to be denied asylum.
The high proportion of defensive applications from each nation, the lower likelihood of defensive
asylum approvals, and the low levels of detained individuals appearing in EOIR court without
counsel negatively affects asylum trends in the region.
Asylum Trends by Nation
Looking at the most recently published DHS data from 2015, 2016, and 2017 each of the
three Northern Triangle nations have experienced a significant increase in asylum applicants in the
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U.S. while approval of their asylum claims has decreased. The following chart is compiled from
the most recent data available in the DHS “Annual Flow Report: Refugees and Asylees: 2017,”
showing the past total number of affirmative and defensive asylum applications received and
approved from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
Table 1. Affirmative and Defensive Asylum Data from
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras 2015 – 2017.
2017

2016

2015

Received

Approved

Rate

Received

Approved

Rate

Received

Approved

Rate

E.S.

47,260

3,471

7.34%

28,372

2,148

7.57%

18,864

2,164

11.48%

Gua.

33,398

2,954

8.84%

22,960

1,916

8.34%

16,657

2,069

12.42%

Hds.

26,736

2,048

7.66%

17,193

1,482

8.62%

14,492

1,407

9.71%

All data in Table 1 is gathered from the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Immigration Statistics and
Office of Strategy, Policy & Plans March 2019 “Annual Flow Report: Refugees and Asylees: 2017.”32

Compared with its 2015 applicants, data from 2017 shows a 150.53% increase in total asylum
applications received from El Salvador compared to 2015 and a difference of -4.14% in the asylum
approval rates.

Similarly, data for Guatemala shows that DHS received 100.50% more

applications in 2017 than in 2015 and the asylum approval rate decreased -3.58%. In 2017 there
were 84.49% more applications for asylum from Honduras than there were in 2015 and the claims
were -2.05% less likely to be approved. The percentage shifts in these asylum trends are indeed
important to note for trend analysis, however it cannot be forgotten that every number evaluated
in this study is an actual person. In 2017 alone 107,394 applications for asylum were processed
from Northern Triangle nations and only 8,473 were approved; 98,921 Central American asylum
seekers were denied.
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When analyzing this table, it is important to include the population of the asylee’s native
country in mind. For example, El Salvador has a population of 6.378 million people and a total of
47,260 asylum applicants in the U.S. in 2017: these applicants make up .75% of the nation’s entire
population. For comparison, another top nation in terms of asylum applications received in the
U.S. is China, and in 2017 DHS received 19,606 applications from the nation of 1.386 billion,
making up .00001% of their population.33 What’s more, 28.30% of the 19,606 applications
received from China were approved in 2017 compared to between 7% and 9% of total applications
for the Northern Triangle nations. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras remain three of the top
six nations applying for affirmative asylum and three of the top four nations applying for defensive
asylum in the U.S., and while the quantity of applications from the Northern Triangle continue to
climb, approval rates are declining. This discrepancy in asylum adjudication trends signals a need
for a policy change that reflects the changing frequency of asylum applications from Central
America.
Asylee Demographic Shift
Not only are the numbers of asylum applications from the Northern Triangle shifting, the
demographics of the applicants are changing as well. In the twentieth century most migrant groups
from Central America, not necessarily asylees, were younger men fleeing the violence and
instability of the region’s civil wars and seeking economic opportunity to support their families at
home. Since the rise of the gangs in the region, this demographic has changed to include huge
numbers of women and children travelling both together and separately.
The twenty-first century has seen a major focus in immigration-related media on the crisis
of unaccompanied minors from the Northern Triangle and Mexico at the southern U.S border. The
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numbers of unaccompanied minors being apprehended at the border has been increasing
exponentially, and in 2013 U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) has reported 21,537 of
apprehensions of unaccompanied minors from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras compared
to 4,059 in 2011.34 This 430% increase in apprehensions of unaccompanied minors from the
Northern Triangle can be directly attributed to the increased violence and criminal behavior of the
region’s gang forces. When asked why they fled their home in a study conducted by the UNHCR
in 2014, 66% of children from El Salvador, 20% of children from Guatemala, and 44% of children
from Honduras cited the fear of violence from armed criminal actors as their primary motivation
for migrating.35
Minors migrating from the Northern Triangle are not always unaccompanied and recent
migration trends from the region show that many women and mothers are migrating with their
children to seek safety in the U.S. DHS reports refer to a mother and child migrating together as
a family unit, and “US Government statistics show that over 66,000 families arrived in the United
States in fiscal year 2014.”36 The majority of the women migrating from Central America have
listed the fear of gang violence, extortion, and sexual assault as the main reasons for moving their
families to the U.S. The UNHCR conducted a study of female migrants from the Northern Triangle
and Mexico in 2015 and found that 85% of the women interviewed were leaving gang-controlled
neighborhoods, where “they described being raped, assaulted, extorted, and threatened by
members of criminal armed groups, including gangs and drug cartels.”37 The first response many
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of the women interviewed had was to report their assaults to the police, however the 60% of the
interviewees that reported attacks received insufficient or no protection from the police and 40%
refused to report to the authorities at all citing the futility of reporting to inept and corrupt
authorities.38 Receiving no protection at home, two-thirds of the women interviewed reported
being internally displaced at one or more points in an attempt to move to a gang-free area within
their own country to no avail.39 The widespread gang violence and the lack of protection from the
government and law enforcement authorities in their countries left these women with no alternative
than to migrate.
Chapter III has utilized data on asylum applications and asylum demographics from both
DHS reports and UNHCR studies to show that there have been major shifts in asylum trends in
the Northern Triangle nations in the past ten years. All three nations have shown an increase in
both affirmative and defensive applications for asylum, a decrease in approval of both affirmative
and defensive claims, and a surge in unaccompanied minor, women, and family units arriving at
the U.S. Southern border. Though the data from the DHS and UNHCR reports clearly shows the
drastic shifts that asylum trends for Central Americans have undergone from 2011 until 2017, there
has been no policy shift in asylum adjudication in response to these new demographics. The rise
in MS-13 and La 18 power, influence, and control in the Northern Triangle is directly correlated
to the increase in migrants and asylum seekers from the region. The extortion, recruitment
techniques, physical and sexual assault that the gangs perpetuate in the region has created a new
refugee crisis in Central America and U.S. asylum policy should reflect that. Having established
relevant legal definitions, a profile of the main gang actors, and a profile of recent migration and
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asylum trends in the region, the following chapters will explore how victims of gang violence from
the Northern Triangle have a legitimate “well-founded fear of persecution” and why victims of
this persecution qualify for political asylum.
Chapter IV. Well-Founded Fear
Referencing the definition of asylum provided in Chapter I, one qualifies for asylum in the
U.S. if they are able to establish a “well-founded fear of persecution” in their native country.
Therefore, in order to analyze the veracity of an asylum claim, it is important to give explicit details
about the threat that the asylee is fleeing; in the case of claims to asylum for victims of gang
violence in the Northern Triangle that means that the “well-founded fear” of gang violence from
gangs must be proven. While Chapter II of this thesis offered historical context and general
demographics for the development and spread of both MS-13 and La 18 in the Northern Triangle
nations of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, this chapter will elaborate on the most common
crimes and forms of violence that the victims profiled in Chapter III are fleeing in order to show
that the threat of gang violence does indeed constitute a well-founded fear of persecution.
Common Crimes
The rise to power that the two main gangs in the Northern Triangle experienced in the
twentieth century are “both a symptom and a cause of a deteriorating security environment,”40 as
the gangs have been overpowering the weak post-war economies and governments in the region.
Gang ranks have swelled due to widespread economic and social insecurity and they engage in a
number of violent criminal activities. According to an FBI assessment, MS-13 members in
particular are engage in “drug distribution, murder, rape, prostitution, robbery, home invasions,
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immigration offenses, kidnapping, carjackings/auto thefts, and vandalism.”41 Most of these
criminal offenses referenced by the FBI are inherently violent and threatening in nature and are
known to affect anyone in the gang’s vicinity, marero or not. Serving as an economic and social
rival to MS-13, La 18 engages in most of the same criminal activity and is shown to have a very
similar hierarchical structure. The rivalry itself seems to be the main difference between the gangs,
as animosity towards MS-13 created “a reason to join, a reason to fight, a reason to celebrate when
one of the other gang’s members was dead”42 for La 18. Local factions of both gangs, also called
clicas, are equally represented in the Northern Triangle nations and the violent enmity between
them only adds to the violent crimes that they bring to the region. Both gangs engage in the same
kinds of regional control tactics, further fueling their conflict, and the two main activities that both
MS-13 and La 18 employ to exploit their territories are la renta, a form of extortion, and physical
assault.
Extortion
One of the main sources of income for both MS-13 and La 18 in all three Northern Triangle
countries is the collection of la renta, a “security” tax and form of extortion. Members of MS-13
and La 18 will charge local business owners a tax for the gang’s “protection” of the business –
protection from whom is unclear. The amount of rent a business owner is charged depends on the
kind of business the owner is involved in and the amount of revenue the business brings in, with
the fee usually oscillating somewhere between 10 and 40 percent of total revenue.43 The amount
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that the two gangs have made off of charging la renta alone has been estimated to be closed to $31
million per year, with some clicas making up to $17,000 per month from extorting businesses.44
In Honduras, an InSight Crime survey of extortion victims has shown that a single clica could
make upwards of $2.5 million a year through extorting taxi and bus companies alone.45 The
victims of extortion are exclusively private citizens, and the corruption of government and local
police forces, discussed in greater detail later, gives the citizens little alternative than to pay la
renta. Locals know that there is no real option other than to cooperate with regard to la renta, as
“complaints to the police about gang extortion are reportedly often relayed back to the gangs,
which then exact severe retribution on the complainants.”46 The extent that extortion remains unor under-reported is vast, and it has been shown in a recent study that roughly 84% of businesses
in El Salvador declined to report the extortion demands they faced for fear that the local authorities
will relay the information back to the gangs.47 Faced with the choice between an economic loss
or a physical assault, the extent of which varies depending on the gang and the amount of la renta,
most business owners are forced to cooperate at the expense of their livelihood.
Assault
Members of MS-13 and La 18 are the main perpetrators of sexual and physical assaults
throughout the Northern Triangle. While the warring gangs engage in transnational inter-gang
violence, civilians are nevertheless often victim to gang-related physical and sexual assaults.
Civilian victims of physical assault are often targeted due to failed attempts at recruitment or
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collection of la renta, as “those who resist or thwart gangs’ efforts to gain financial, territorial, or
political control suffer the consequences; gangs intimidate, coerce, torture, murder, and decapitate
in service of these goals.”48 The price for resisting or rebuking either gang’s activities is one’s
physical security, and the retribution is swift. The frequency of demands for violent revenge
exacted by gang leaders can be seen in a 2016 recording of an MS-13 meeting in El Salvador,
where fourteen homicides of gang members, recruits, and civilians were authorized by gang
leaders in the course of an hour; the same recording shows that five days later another 12 murders
were authorized.49 Whether the victims of these homicides were involved in gang activities or not
is unclear, but it is likely that civilians were among the victims because a study conducted by the
Guatemalan Procuradoría de Derechos Humanos [Attorney General for Human Rights] showed
that 27.4% of deaths of those 25 and under from July 2002 to August 2003 were the result of gang
attacks on civilians.50 Murder is an extreme form of violence that civilians in gang-controlled
areas are victim and witness to, however other physical and sexual assaults are similarly common.
The victims of sexual assaults perpetrated by gang members are not limited by gender or
involvement; men, women, civilians, and gang-members alike have fallen victim to assault by high
ranking mareros: “Women are routinely abused and raped within the gang community… Gang
members inside jail have been known to take advantage of their privilege with younger,
incarcerated members, and gang members on the outside have been known to rape women without
any consequences.”51 With gender and gang membership being of little consequence to who suffer
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physical and sexual assaults committed by mareros there are few options to avoid becoming a
victim.
MS-13 and La 18 engage in various criminal activities and forms of violence in the region,
targeting mareros and civilians alike. The widespread violence that the citizens of the Northern
Triangle nations face from the gangs has a direct link to the migratory trends of the region, and
contributes to the growing number of Central American asylum seekers in the U.S. Given the
demand of la renta and the widespread homicides, physical, and sexual assaults in the region, the
asylum qualification of a “well-founded fear of persecution” has been met by the victims of gang
violence in the Northern Triangle. The impunity that mareros are able to utilize in the Northern
Triangle is a result of the state and security force’s failure to protect their citizenry and the
following chapter will explore the ways in which the gang activities in the region constitute a
“well-founded fear of persecution based on political opinion” by analyzing the gang infiltration of
and widespread corruption within the region’s governments.
Chapter V. The Politics of Gangs
Violence in the Northern Triangle is rampant and perpetrated by two main armed groups,
the gangs of MS-13 and La 18 and the state security forces. Both the gangs and the security forces
in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras foster a culture of violence by engaging in extremely
violent confrontations with each other and civilians are often caught in the crossfire. The forces
that are meant to protect victims of gang violence in the region spread violence similar to the gangs
and have been shown to be either inefficient or corrupted by gang bribery. By being both unwilling
and unable to protect their citizenry, the state has failed the victims of gang violence and has
allowed the gangs to function as de facto political entities. The four previous chapters of this thesis
have set out to define historical and legal definitions of asylum, to profile both the perpetrators and
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victims of gang violence in Central America, and to show that the criminal activity threatening
asylum-seekers from Central America constitutes a “well-founded fear of persecution.” This
chapter will outline the ways in which gang violence constitutes political persecution in the
Northern Triangle by showing how the government forces have failed to protect their citizens, how
they have been corrupted by gang influence, and how the gangs have become legitimized political
entities.
Failed Policies
The governments of the Northern Triangle nations have consistently failed in their efforts
to combat gang violence in the region. Their attempts at combating MS-13 and La 18’s territorial
control is evidence in the failure of the region’s mano dura, or “iron fist,” policies. The laws were
first introduced in 2003 by then-President of El Salvador Francisco Flores Pérez and subsequently
adopted by then-President of Guatemala Otto Pérez Molina and then-President of Honduras
Ricardo Maduro. An extreme effort to eliminate the gang threat in Central America, the mano dura
policies gave power to local police and federal security agents to arrest and interrogate individuals
with impunity. In the first years of the program in the early 2000s El Salvador, security forces
“carried out mass arrests without legal basis and made excessive and arbitrary use of detention,
especially of youth suspected of being gang members. The security forces have reportedly
subjected suspected gang members in their custody to severe physical mistreatment. Newspaper
journalists reporting on these stories have reportedly received death threats.”52 Police and military
forces in the region used mano dura as an excuse to propagate the same the widespread violence
and fear-mongering tactics of the gangs in the name of security. Not only was the policy
controversial for its contribution to the culture of violence in the Northern Triangle, but it did not
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have a marked effect on the criminal activities or influence of the gangs. When the mano dura
policy was ultimately declared unconstitutional by the Salvadoran Supreme Court, an undeterred
President Flores introduced the policy of super mano dura, a fortified version of the original
policy. The policy was similarly unsuccessful, and super mano dura “is reported to have provided
the impetus for gangs to become more organized and ruthless, whilst at the same time engendering
among members of the security forces a lack of respect for the human rights of youth suspected of
being gang members.”53 As evidenced by the failed violent and overreaching tactics of mano dura
and super mano dura, the Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran state security forces have not
only failed to protect their civilian populations but their failure has resulted in an increase in gang
organization and recruitment.
Despite the condemnation of mano dura policies by the United Nations, the heavy-handed
approach remains popular with the current governments in the region. In El Salvador, for example,
current Salvadoran President Salvador Sánchez Cerén has been criticized for continuing mano
dura policies and being ineffective at combatting gang violence. The criticism comes after
analysis of his anti-gang policies shows that homicide rates in 2018 reached levels comparable to
the peak homicide rate in 2015.54 Recent anti-gang policies in Guatemala have also failed, and in
2006 the United Nations and the Guatemalan government created the Comisión Internacional
contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG) to create an international body in the nation to help
prosecute organized crime and other complicated cases. The agreement came to an end on January
7th, 2019 when Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales’ expelled of CICIG despite objections from
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his country’s Constitutional Court.55 In 2019 Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández has
largely focused his anti-gang policies on continuing the ineffective mano dura policies by sending
military and national police forces into the streets to arrest suspected gang members, and his
presidency remains engulfed in controversy surrounding his avoidance to target drug-traffickers
in Honduras and the violent suppression of protesters against his presidency.56 The Northern
Triangle nation’s governments continued reliance on mano dura policies that have proven to be
both repressive and ineffective and have allowed the ranks of MS-13 and La 18 to continue to
grow.
Regional Corruption
It is not only policy failures that have contributed to government ineffectiveness in the
Northern Triangle as the governments failures are further complicated by the region’s extensive
political corruption. The World Bank’s Governance Indicators from 2008 show that levels of
public trust in the governments of three nations are some of the lowest in the world and have
continued to decline. Global measurements of the Indicator for Control of Corruption places
Honduras in the bottom quintile and global measures of the Rule of Law places El Salvador in the
bottom third of the world and Guatemala in the bottom 10%.57 Corruption in the region is
spearheaded by gang influences and interests and has been reported in the police, military, and
judicial branches of each Northern Triangle nation.
Police Corruption
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The corruption of police forces in the Northern Triangle is a widespread and critical
problem; victims of gang violence are unable to trust the forces designated to protect them. As of
2010, 48.8% of Salvadorans, 65.9% of Guatemalans, and 47.2% of Hondurans surveyed in an
AmericasBarometer study believe that their local police are involved in criminal activities.58 This
public distrust of police forces is due to frequent media reports of police officers’ involvements in
homicides, physical assaults, and gang activities and has created an environment where gang
victims are unable to report criminal activity to the police. Recalling the description of la renta in
Chapter IV, victims of extortion very rarely report the crime to the police for fear that the officer
will report their complaint directly back to the gang that extorted them. What is more, “frequent
arrests of high-level police officers who have been involved in organized crime rings while
themselves leading the all‐out war against gangs suggest, for example, that the scope of police
reforms have been hindered by the very efforts expended in carrying out draconian wars against
gang‐led crime.”59 The policy failures mentioned earlier have contributed to levels of police
corruption in the Northern Triangle nations and have intensified public distrust of security forces.
The corruption of police forces further oppresses victims of gang violence and is one of the signs
of the significant role that MS-13 and La 18 play in the politics in the region.
Military Corruption
Military forces in post-civil war Central America maintain a tense relationship with the
public. The civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala were marked by tumultuous military coups,
widespread violence, and repression. Honduras was used as a military training ground for various
C.I.A. backed counter-insurgent forces and the Battalion 3-16, a Honduran army unit that tortured
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and murdered political insurgents. In the twenty-first century, civilians still maintain a wary
perception of the military and must frequently interact with the military since soldiers are often
deployed to carry out police functions. The public’s relationship to the military has not improved
since this intense period in the twentieth century and the reported MS-13 and La 18 infiltration of
military forces has done nothing to improve public trust. The relationships between the militaries
and the gangs in the Northern Triangle are reciprocal as gang infiltration of the military is offset
by military presence in the gangs and for most “it is no coincidence that many criminal syndicates
there are run by retired military officers with political connections.”60 Furthermore, in 2002 the
Guatemalan military’s entire Anti-Narcotics Operation Department had to be disbanded after 320
officials were found to be on the payroll of local criminal leaders, aiding rather than eliminating
the influence of drug traffickers and gangs in the country.61 The mutually beneficial relationship
between the major gangs in the Northern Triangle and the military forces tasked with combatting
them shows that the gangs are powerful enough to wield great influence over governmental
security forces, further jeopardizing the safety of victims of gang violence.
Judicial Corruption
Corruption in the Northern Triangle is not limited to its security forces; should a crime
reach a judiciary in the region its adjudication will still be subject to gang influence. The low level
of prosecutions and indictments of gang members for their involvement in extortion, drug
trafficking, or assault have shown that MS-13 and La 18 have influence in the courts. The Insight
Crime analysis of MS-13 in the Northern Triangle references the case of marero Moris Alexander
Bercián Manchón, a.k.a. “El Barney,” tried for drug trafficking in El Salvador in 2009: “Since his
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capture, judges designated to hear the case have postponed hearings, suddenly become ill and even
released Barney on his own recognizance only to have him flee when they reissued orders to
capture him.”62 The case of “El Barney” in 2009 is one of many examples where gang influence
results in judicial ineptitude in the Northern Triangle. It has been reported that in cases involving
the prosecution of gang members, “various organs of the justice system appear to be acting in
criminal complicity by lending a veneer of legitimacy to acts of judicial corruption… This has
implications for other public agencies and sometimes involves illicit ties to individual attorneys or
law practices.”63 The expansion of corruption ties to attorneys and law practices shows that the
entire criminal justice systems in place in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras are susceptible to
corruption from MS-13 and La 18 influences. The strength of the gangs has allowed them to
manipulate police, military, and judicial forces in the region and has aided in creating an
environment of lawlessness surrounding gang activity. The victims of gang violence and gang
crimes are left with little plausible recourse in pursuing justice for their suffering.
The impact that MS-13 and La 18 exert on security forces and judicial systems in the
Northern Triangle shows that their influence in the region is inherently political.

Having

preferential influence within the very forces that are tasked with arresting and indicting the
mareros, MS-13 and La 18 have established a firm standing within the political systems of El
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.
Political Aspirations
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The first step that shows how MS-13 and La 18 are becoming more political in their
structures is the establishment and maintenance of influence within the security forces and judicial
systems in the Northern Triangle. The second step of their political transformation is made evident
by “…their willingness to form a coalition with rival factions, by new tactics aimed at influencing
the political process, and by their stated objectives to do more than earn money.”64 Factions of
both MS-13 and La 18 are cooperating with one another in order to overpower political opponents
that hinder their goals of financial and territorial gains. The structures and rivalries of the gangs
are adapting in response to mano dura policies and their ability to infiltrate governmental forces
and they are leveraging their power into political influence.
Gang Truce
The first time that members of MS-13 and La 18 were brought to the same negotiating
table was the 2012 San Salvador gang truce. The truce was supported by the El Salvador
government and the Catholic Church and lasted from 2012 until 2013, a year that saw a 50%
decline in the nation’s homicide rate.65 The truce was mediated by government and church officials
and was reached by negotiating less gang violence for more freedom for gang leaders in prisons.
During the 2012 negotiations, “the Government recognized that all parties had a legitimate role in
the dialog to ease the violence… the truce provided a framework for separate criminal
organizations to create a single opposition political movement.”66 By involving gang-leaders in
official negotiations the Salvadoran government recognized and therefore legitimized the role of
gangs in the nation’s security and politics. As part of the truce the Salvadoran government lessened
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restrictions on gang-leaders in prison and decreased raids on gang-led neighborhoods, thus
establishing a political route for MS-13 and La 18 to join together and bargain for more favorable
treatment from the state. When the truce ultimately dissolved in 2013, the gangs knew that they
had influence within the government and used violent means to bring the government back into
negotiations by proclaiming a transport strike and murdering city bus drivers who disobeyed.67
Having negotiated with the government in an official capacity during the 2012 truce, the political
roles of MS-13 and La 18 in El Salvador were essentially confirmed.

As fundamentally

transnational organizations, the gangs have continued to solidify their political status throughout
the Northern Triangle.
Mara 503
The negotiations of the 2012 truce in El Salvador brought high-ranking members of MS13 and La 18 together on the same side of the table, in effect producing a coalition of gang interests
in the region. The power of their role in the negotiations has led some members from both gangs
to deflect and create a supra-organization of both gangs’ political interests called Mara 503: "Mara
503 spokespersons stated that they intended to seek greater political influence by participating in
elections, controlling local elected officials, especially mayors, infiltrating police and military
forces and taking over civilian associations.”68 While the influence of gangs in political structures
in the Northern Triangle have since been based on more clandestine infiltration and corruption of
political forces, Mara 503 presents itself as an intentionally political group that means to exert
even greater influence and control over political and security forces in the region. Mara 503 is
mostly active in El Salvador, however the Salvadoran government has issued alerts to authorities
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in Guatemala and Honduras regarding the likely spread of the gang over their borders. The 2018
account of a member of Mara 503 being apprehended by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol shows
that the influence of this new organization is spreading transnationally.69 While the inter-gang
cooperation and formation of Mara 503 are recent to the twenty-first century, gangs have pursued
political influence in the Northern Triangle since their introduction into the region’s post-war
government instability.
Law & Order
The inability and unwillingness of the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras to effectively combat MS-13 and La 18 within their borders is exacerbated by their
institutional weaknesses. The instability and inefficiency of the region’s governments has made it
difficult for their citizens to access basic services and protections and in these instances’ clicas of
MS-13 and La 18 have stepped in to fill the void. The extent of the role that the gangs play in
local services is dependent on the political and social capital that they have gained in the area. In
areas that a faction has a strong foot-hold on la renta and territorial control, gang members have
been shown to “act as an effective arbiter in domestic or neighborly disputes; participate directly
in community associations or non-governmental organizations; provide votes (or impede them) in
elections as well as other services for local political actors; and open the door to economic
opportunity.”70 The absence of any police or government influence in gang-controlled areas
creates an opportunity for the mareros to act as de-facto political organizations and provide
services for the people living in their territory. In these areas the gangs are paid la renta, they
engage in their criminal activities and export violence freely and are able to structure society to
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their preferences. The corruption and inefficiency of state police, military, and judicial forces have
created a political vacuum that members of MS-13 and La 18 have been all-too-willing to fill.
Chapter V has shown the extent to which factions of MS-13 and La 18 have influenced
politics in the Northern Triangle. The combination of the failure of the Salvadoran, Guatemalan,
and Honduran governments mano dura policies, the corruption of security and judicial forces in
the region, and the politicization of MS-13, La 18, and Mara 503 show that the current role of
gangs in the Northern Triangle is inherently political. They have infiltrated standing government
forces, begun to establish a semblance of a political party to export their ideals, and functioned as
de facto governments in neglected territories. Following the UNHCR interpretation of political
opinion to include ‘any opinion on any matter in which the machinery of State, government,
society, or policy may be engaged,’71 victims of gang violence from the Northern Triangle qualify
for political asylum in the U.S. based on a well-founded fear of persecution based on anti-gang
political opinion.
Conclusion
The topic of analysis of this thesis merits further research regarding precedential case law
concerning asylum and previous claims of political persecution. An analysis of adjudication of
asylum claims for victims of terrorist organizations could be used in a comparison of the structure
of terrorist organizations and international gangs. Additionally, any advocation for the rights of
gang victims in the U.S. would need to be judged against the current political environment and
popular immigration-related rhetoric in the U.S.
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The right to asylum has been internationally protected in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights for over 71 years. The United States has been a signatory to the refugee protections
codified in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees for 68 years. Turning our back
on asylum seekers at our Southern border is not only amoral, it goes against international
regulations that our nation agreed to over half a century ago. It would appear that our nation has
always had a questionable asylum adjudication process, as a 1970 piece by famed refugee advocate
Arthur Helton raises critiques that ring true today. Helton argued 39-years-ago that “The right to
asylum itself is under attack. We hear often of a "crisis" in asylum in America. That crisis,
however, lies not in the increasing numbers of asylum seekers, but rather in whether the right of
asylum can withstand the expedient policy solutions which have until now governed the
process.”72 The asylum process in the U.S. is not reflective of the conditions that asylum seekers
flee, and the historical preference for communism defectors and European nations shows this. Not
only is the U.S. a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and therefore
obligated to protect the world’s most vulnerable migrants, but when our nation’s policies and
foreign interventions create political and criminal environments abroad that are unlivable for its
people, we have a heightened responsibility to offer safety.

Helton’s piece explains how

partisanship and foreign policy have sullied the asylum process in the U.S. and highlights the risks
of flexible policies. He states that “The notion that asylum may be denied as a matter of
"discretion" is questionable under international and domestic law. Whether the "discretionary
asylum" concept will be expanded to cover other situations remains to be seen. Any such expansion
would risk swallowing whole the right to asylum.”73 Echoing Helton, this thesis argues that the
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right to asylum is not discretionary. An analysis of the circumstances of victims of gang violence
in the Northern Triangle shows that there are legitimate claims to political asylum on the basis of
a well-founded fear of persecution based on anti-gang political beliefs.
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Glossary (alphabetical)
CBP

– Customs and Border Patrol, the federal enforcement agency of the
Department of homeland Security

CICIG

– Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala / The
International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala

Clicas

– The Spanish word for local factions of gangs

DHS

– Department of Homeland Security

EOIR

– Executive Office for Immigration Review, the judicial branch of the
Department of Homeland Security

FMLN

– Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, one of major political
parties in El Salvador

IIRIRA

– The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996

INA

– The Immigration and Nationality Act

La 18

– Barrio 18, the second most powerful gang in the Northern Triangle

Mano dura

– “the iron fist,” a set of harsh anti-gang policies in the Northern Triangle

Mareros

– the Spanish word for gang members

MS-13

– Mara Salvatrucha, the most powerful gang in the Northern Triangle

Northern Triangle

– refers to the nations of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras

Policia nacional civil – the Spanish translation of National Civil Police
La renta

– an extorton tax collected by the gangs

UDHR

– the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UNHCR

– The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USCIS

– United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
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